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Abstract 
Short selling is a common practice in many developed markets. However, due to the lack of a suitable 
regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure, short selling cannot be practiced in many emerging 
market countries. Furthermore, the regulators who were concerned about potential adverse effects of 
short selling during various episodes of crises decided to place some constraints on short selling at 
different points in time and for different periods of time. Based on the experience with the short selling 
practices and the bans on short selling in different countries around the world and by respecting the 
assumption that there is at least a basic regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure, the author 
will try to answer the question: Could short selling improve the quality of emerging stock markets? 
According to the author’s findings, short selling could improve the quality of emerging stock markets, 
under the determined condition. Additionally, as the regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure 
becomes more and more developed, the possibility of the market quality to be improved to a higher 
degree by short selling will increase. 
 
Key words: short selling, short sale bans, emerging stock markets, stock markets performance, stock 
market quality 
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Introduction 
 
Short selling is the sale of a security which is not owned by the seller at the time of the agreement. There 
are two forms of short sale transactions, i.e. two mechanisms to sell a security short. Within the first 
mechanism, the seller borrows a security from a security lender and sells it to a buyer in the open market, 
then he buys the security and returns it to the security lender at some point in the future. Therefore, the 
seller borrows the security before selling it. In this way, the seller guarantees availability of the security 
for its successful delivery on the settlement date. Such short selling is the covered short selling. The 
second form of short sale transactions is called naked or uncovered short selling. Opposite to the 
covered short selling, the naked short selling implies that the sellers do not borrow or even intend to 
borrow securities which they are due to deliver to the buyers on the settlement date of the transaction. 
In other words, the short sellers sell securities without previously securing the availability of the securities 
on the settlement date of the transaction. Thereby, the short sellers cannot guarantee that they will have 
an access to the securities at the time of settlement. If the naked short seller cannot borrow the security 
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for its successful delivery on the settlement date, there is a probability that the transaction will fail. (see: 
Yadav, Fotak and Raman, 2009; Bianchi and Drew, 2012) 
 
There is an increased interest in short selling of a security if it is overvalued. In other words, the economic 
nature of different securities is the main motivator for short selling. 
 
When the short sellers anticipate decline in the price of a security, they take a short sale position. They 
make a profit if the security price declines. Conversely, the short sellers incur losses if the price rises. 
As this trading strategy creates opportunities for making a profit, short selling is a common practice, 
primarily in developed financial markets. Furthermore, by shorting the securities, the short sellers 
depress securities prices. Economists and regulators generally agree that it is good for short selling to 
depress the prices of securities if the securities are overvalued and if the securities prices regress to 
their fundamental values in this way. The short sellers provide a valuable service to investors in some 
markets if they identify overvalued securities and correct mispricing. However, if the short selling pushes 
securities prices below their fundamental values, then it is counterproductive. Although the short selling 
can artificially depress securities prices below their fundamental values, it is not easy for the short sellers 
to make a profit in this trading strategy. Namely, the security price decrease caused by shorting the 
securities may be higher, equal to or lower than the security price increase caused by buying the 
securities to close the short sale position. The short sellers will make a profit only if they can buy 
securities at lower prices than they sold them for, in order to close the short sale position. The difference 
between the selling price and the buying price should be higher than trading costs. Otherwise, the short 
sellers will incur losses. 
 
In short selling strategy, the short sellers can make a profit not only by shorting the overpriced securities, 
but also by shorting some securities that are priced correctly. Making a profit by shorting some securities 
that are not overvalued is incorrect but possible when the short seller weakens investors’ confidence in 
the issuer whose securities were sold short. Another way in which the short seller may make a profit 
within short sale transaction implies that he somehow fools other investors into selling him the securities 
at a price that is lower than the one he charged to his buyers of securities. This possibility is present 
until investors catch the short seller in his game. If this happens before the short seller purchases the 
securities to cover his short position, he can suffer substantial losses as the investors drive up security 
prices. Moreover, the short seller may try to maintain security prices low by spreading false rumours 
about the issuer or by attempting to manipulate the prices of his securities in order to make a profit 
through short sale transactions of correctly priced securities. Since these activities are illegal, the 
security issuer may be expected to fight back. Following the above mentioned it appears that making a 
profit in this way may be risky, incorrect and very unprofitable. (see: Battalio, Mehran and Schultz, 2012) 
 
Besides the economic features of securities, there are some other motivators for short selling. Some 
researchers discerned larger presence of the short sellers around particular corporate events such as 
analyst forecast revisions, analyst downgrades, disappointing earnings announcements and the 
discoveries of financial misconduct. However, there is no consensus among the researchers whether 
bad news events cause short selling or not. 
 
Investors who believe the securities are overpriced and expect to make a profit by purchasing the 
securities at lower prices than they sold them for will maintain short positions for longer periods. Contrary 
to these investors, market makers and high-frequency traders generally sell securities short for short 
periods, typically for a few minutes or even for a few seconds. Market makers and high-frequency traders 
are the major short sale traders. Most short sales are conducted by them and especially by options 
market makers who sell short to hedge their option positions. (see: Battalio, Mehran and Schultz, 2012) 
 
A short selling transaction can be a hedging or a speculative one. Hence, a trader can enter a short 
selling transaction to transfer a risk or to speculate on security price movement. Due to the possibility of 
achieving different trading objectives, the short selling transactions are commonly employed in many 
markets around the world, including stock markets, bond markets, global foreign exchange markets, 
gold bullion markets, futures and options markets, for both risk transfer (hedging) and speculation. In 
this article, we will focus on short selling in stock markets. 
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Each market has to meet the institutional, personnel information and regulatory requirements for the 
short selling to be effective. Specifically, an efficient stock-lending system, a short sale order execution 
system and short sale supervisory system need to be established, the reliable and occupational stock-
lenders, stock-borrowers, short sale order executors and short sales regulators need to be qualified, the 
up-to-date accounting data and other information on the participants in the short selling process need 
to be provided, and the comprehensive regulation of short sales need to be established. Due to the lack 
of a suitable regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure, the short selling cannot be practiced in 
many emerging market countries. (see: Fantazzini and Maggi, 2012) 
 
On a regular basis, the short selling has drawn the attention of scientists, regulators and general public 
in the periods of market collapses. This was the case during the global financial crisis, too. Every time 
the question whether the short sellers were responsible for panic selling and massive stock price 
declines was raised or for the correction of mispricing, liquidity increase and volatility decrease, i.e. for 
market quality improvement.  
 
The author intends to provide the knowledge necessary for the policy makers, market regulators and 
participants to strengthen or make a decision about the short selling affirmation in emerging stock 
markets. More specifically, the results in this paper could motivate policy makers, market regulators and 
participants to find an appropriate approach for further affirmation of short selling in the emerging stock 
markets in which the short selling is allowed. They could also motivate market regulators in the emerging 
stock markets in which the short selling is banned to rethink the decision about the prohibition of short 
selling in their countries, and then  make a decision about the short selling affirmation, collaborating with 
policy makers and participants. The results in this paper will be of use to the researchers as well. The 
researchers could be motivated to provide scientific support for the short selling affirmation in emerging 
stock markets to be effective. The researchers could, for example, investigate if there are market 
conditions under which the short selling activity in emerging stock markets could be detrimental to stock 
price efficiency, and measuring the effectiveness of bans on short selling in emerging stock markets, 
and other relevant issues. 
 
Based on the experience with the short selling practices and the bans on short selling in different 
countries around the world and by respecting the assumption that there is at least a basic regulatory, 
institutional and market infrastructure, we will try to answer the question: Could short selling improve the 
quality of emerging stock markets? To answer this question, we need to understand the short selling 
process i.e. the activities and participants in this process. We also need to consider the theoretical 
knowledge and the experience associated with the implications of short selling on emerging stock 
markets performance and the consequences of imposing constraints on short selling. These issues will 
be addressed in the following four sections of the article. Finally, we will come to the conclusion. 
 
 
Short Selling: Activities and Participants in the Process  
 
The covered short selling process starts with the short seller’s borrowing the stocks from the stock 
owner, either directly or through an intermediary. To arrange a stock lending/borrowing transaction, the 
short seller seeks a counterparty which owns or holds the stocks and which is willing to lend those 
stocks. The demand for stocks intended to be borrowed and sold short by the short seller and the supply 
of stocks intended to be lent for a fee by its owner or holder are matched in the stock lending market.  
 
Three key participants in a stock lending/borrowing transaction are a stock owner, a stock lender and a 
stock borrower. The stock owner is the entity whose shares are lent/borrowed in the stock 
lending/borrowing transaction. When the stock owner decides to lend his shares directly to borrowers, 
he simultaneously takes over the role of the stock lender as well. In this case, he has to establish and 
maintain his own internal lending department. By establishing this department and directly lending the 
shares to borrowers, the stock owner retains total control over the lending process and can obtain 
additional revenue. However, only the largest institutional investors, such as insurance companies and 
pension funds that have shares in their portfolios can lend the securities in this way, because the costs 
of setting up a lending department and other necessary infrastructure are high. Frequently, the stock 
owners lend their shares through an intermediary. In this type of stock lending, two different entities take 
over the role of the stock owner and the role of the stock lender. In other words, the intermediary acts 
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as the stock lender. The largest intermediaries between the stock owners and the stock borrowers have 
traditionally been custodian banks. The custodian banks lend shares on behalf of the stock owners and 
any revenue generated by stock lending is divided among them in accordance with a prearranged fee 
sharing agreement. Besides the custodian banks, some other agents, e.g. asset managers and dealers 
also lend shares on behalf of the stock owners, but they do not act as custodian institutions for these 
securities. The stock owners obtain more lending revenue by lending the shares through these 
intermediaries than by lending through custodian banks.  
 
In the stock lending/borrowing transaction, the stock borrowers are the short sellers. They are usually 
“prime brokerage firms facilitating the short demand for their own proprietary trading desks, for their 
hedge fund clients and other leveraged investors” (Reed, 2013, 254). The short sellers were proven to 
be skilled investors and to earn more return per deal than unskilled traders. The evidence was provided 
by Chague and Giovannetti (2017) and Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti (2019) in the research 
covering 4,575,324 stock loan contracts closed in the Brazil Stock Market from January 2012 to 
December 2014. The skilled short sellers “contribute to the price discovery process by accelerating the 
incorporation of negative information into stock prices, instead of by avoiding short-term price 
overshooting” (Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti, 2019, 90). Additionally, these two groups of authors 
found that the short sellers have the stock-picking and market-timing skills. In their study, Chague, De-
Losso and Giovannetti stated: “With respect to stock-picking, we find that skilled short-sellers are more 
likely to pick value, liquid, short- and long-term losers, and high-volatility stocks. With respect to timing, 
we find that skilled short-sellers are more likely to initiate a short position after price drops, prior to 
earning announcements and around sell recommendations.” (Chague, De-Losso and Giovannetti, 2019, 
90) Besides these two skills, Chague and Giovannetti uncovered the cover-timing skill for the short 
sellers as well. This skill is based on the ability of the short sellers to choose the time point when to 
cover their short selling positions. 
 
Most stock loans in the stock lending market are made in widely held stocks which are cheap to borrow. 
The rest of the stock loans is made in the stocks which are less popular among the stock holders and 
more expensive to borrow. “Finding the shares to borrow can sometimes be a problem. Brokers often 
borrow shares from the accounts of their customers, although this practice is restricted. Institutions can 
and do lend shares from their portfolios in the institutional stock lending market. In the typical stock loan 
agreement, the lender can demand the return of the shares at any time. This gives the lender the 
flexibility to sell the shares at any time. [...] Furthermore, the borrower can also return the shares at any 
time. Less frequently, the borrower and lender may agree to a term loan of the shares in which the 
shares may not be recalled for a fixed period of time.” (Angel and McCabe, 2009, 240)  
 
The settlement of a stock lending transaction takes three trading days. In most equity markets, a stock 
sale is also settled in three trading days. As the transfer of stocks both from the lender to the borrower 
and from the seller to the buyer occurs in T + 3, i.e. three days after the transaction date, a short seller 
will borrow a stock on the same day when he sells the stock short in order to simultaneously ensure the 
delivery of stocks to the buyer by the deadline, and to minimise borrowing costs.  
 
When the short seller receives the borrowed stocks from the lender, in return, he has to transfer the 
cash or other securities as collateral. The short seller places cash rather than other securities with the 
stock lender. Usually, the short seller places the proceeds from the short sale as a deposit with the stock 
lender. The amount of cash and the value of securities have to be equal to or slightly higher than the 
market value of the stocks. Based on the previously stated fact, it is clear that the covered short selling 
is a fully collateralised transaction. The value of the stock loan is adjusted to the market on a  daily basis. 
If the stock price increases, the stock lender will require additional collateral for the loan. However, if the 
stock price decreases, the stock lender will return some of the collateral to the short seller. When the 
short seller returns the stock loan to the stock lender, the stock lender returns the collateral to the short 
seller. These two returning operations occur simultaneously. The short seller can provide stocks to sell 
them short not only by collateralised stock loans, but also by a repurchasing agreement. “The typical 
and economically equivalent operation for cash - rather than security-driven transaction - is a 
repurchasing agreement or a buy/sell back, whereby received security serves as collateral for a cash 
loan” (Geraci and Veredas, 2016, 5), as Geraci and Veredas stated. 
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A stock loan which is collateralised with cash can be a viable alternative for lender’s financing. Additional 
benefit of the stock lending for the stock lender is the possibility to earn a stock lending fee. This fee 
refers to the price the short seller effectively pays for borrowing the stock, i.e. the price of the stock loan. 
It depends on the supply of and demand for the stock loan and varies over time. The stock lending fee 
is low for the vast majority of stocks that are easy to borrow. However, the short sellers pay much higher 
prices for stocks that are hard to borrow. Some stocks will be hard to borrow if they are less widely held 
and consequently, if they are in high borrowing demand and/or in low lending supply. These stocks are 
said to be trading special, or just special. Only few stocks are traded special each day. The specials are 
not exclusively small stocks. They are identified by increased stock lending fees and, thus, by their low 
so-called rebate rates. The special stocks are hard to borrow not only due to the higher borrowing costs, 
but also due to another problem. Namely, special stocks “present additional difficulties to borrowers. 
Only well-placed investors, e.g., large proprietary trading desks, can borrow specials and receive the 
reduced rebate. Brokers generally do not borrow special shares on behalf of small investors and instead 
deny short-sale orders. Loans in stock specials are therefore expensive for well-placed investors and 
impossible to obtain for retail investors.” (Reed, 2013, 248) The short seller does not pay a stock lending 
fee by transferring cash to the stock lender. Instead, the stock lender receives the spread between the 
current market interest rate and the rebate rate paid to the short seller. 
 
During the stock lending period, the stock lender invests received cash collateral and earns interests. 
The interest on the invested cash collateral is calculated at the current market interest rate. A part of the 
earned interest returns to the short seller. It is calculated at the rebate rate. The rebate rate is negotiated 
between the short seller and the stock lender on a case-by-case basis. It effectively determines the 
stock lending fee and vice versa. The higher (lower) the stock lending fee, the lower (higher) the rebate 
rate is. Hence, the rebate rate is higher if the stocks are easy to borrow. In this case, the rebate rate is 
slightly below the current market interest rate. Conversely, the rebate rate is lower if the stocks are hard 
to borrow. In such event, the rebate rate may be substantially below the current market interest rate. In 
rare and mostly extreme cases, the rebate rate can be negative. If the rebate rate is negative, the short 
seller will pay interest to the stock lender rather than the other way around. 
 
Based on everything previously mentioned, we can conclude that the short seller earns the current 
market interest rate minus the stock lending fee. The short seller can expect to earn almost full rebate 
rate on the collateral or the general collateral rate of the stocks which are easy to borrow. Of the stocks 
which are not so easily available for borrowing, the short seller can expect to earn the rate which is 
below the general collateral rate or, extremely, to make a loss in the stock lending transaction. 
 
After the short seller borrows stocks, he will sell them at the prevailing market price to a stock buyer. 
The stock buyer is usually unaware that he is participating in a short selling transaction. Between the 
short selling date and the maturity date of stock borrowing/lending contract, the short seller has to 
repurchase the equivalent stocks in the market. If the stock price falls during this time, the short seller 
will repurchase the stocks at a lower price and thereby make a profit from the price difference. However, 
if the stock price rises, the short seller will suffer a loss in the short selling transaction. Finally, the short 
seller has to repay the stock loan by delivering the stocks back to the stock lender at the maturity date 
of the stock borrowing/lending contract. The short selling transaction is closed and the covered short 
selling process is finished when the short seller returns the stocks to the lender. 
 
The naked short selling process takes less time. This process takes place without stock 
borrowing/lending. Given that the availability of stock provides guarantee for successful settlement of 
the short selling transaction, in the case when the stock borrowing/lending is excluded from the process 
“the short sale may result in a delivery failure in which the buyer fails to receive shares and the lender 
may fail to deliver those shares. Despite regulatory scrutiny of the issue, the academic community has 
paid limited attention to the issue.” (Reed, 2013, 249) 
  
General Overview of the Short Selling Implications on Stock Markets’ 
Performance  
 
Regulators, governments and media share the popular view that short sellers trigger market declines. 
Thereby, the short sellers were blamed for distorting business activities, panic selling and large declines 
in the market. Due to the belief in negative influence of the short sellers, regulators in many countries 
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introduced new regulations and imposed bans on the short sales in order to end the downturn in the 
markets during the global financial crisis and debt crisis. However, financial theory and financial 
economists take different views on the short sellers and the implications of their trading on stock market 
quality. On the one hand, most literature (e.g. Yadav, Fotak and Raman, 2009; Lecce, Lepone, 
McKenzie and Segara, 2012; Massa, Zhang and Zhang, 2015; Sobaci, Sensoy and Erturk, 2014; Chen 
and Rhee, 2010; Chague, De-Losso, De Genaro and Giovannetti, 2013; Feng and Chan, 2016; Jung, 
Kim and Lee, 2013; Wang, Lee and Woo, 2017)  explains that short sellers improve the overall market 
quality by enhancing the price efficiency, the stock price predictability, the liquidity, the stability and the 
short sales profitability, as well as by detecting financial misconduct in the market. On the other hand, 
some theorists (e.g. Geraci and Veredas, 2016; Thornock, 2013; Ni and Yin, 2019; Luo, Ni, and Tian, 
2019) argue that short sellers follow manipulative and predatory trading strategies, which cause less 
informative prices, i.e. pressures focused on the initiation of stock price increase and the formation of 
overpriced stocks, firm decisions distortion, firm value dampening and market destabilisation. 
 
According to the widely accepted standpoints (e.g. Boehmer and Wu, 2012; Lee, 2016; Edwards and 
Hanley, 2010; Blau and Brough, 2012; Yadav, Fotak and Raman, 2009; Lecce, Lepone, McKenzie and 
Segara, 2012; Sobaci, Sensoy and Erturk, 2014; Lee and Wang, 2015; Jung, Kim and Lee, 2013), the 
short selling provides the efficient price discovery process. As most empirical studies suggest that the 
short sellers are informed and rational traders, the short selling may be used, and it is often used, as a 
mispricing correction tool. The short selling helps to incorporate negative information into stock prices 
and helps to align stock prices with their fundamental values. It increases the speed of the adjustment 
of security prices to the relevant information.  
 
The possibility of selling stocks short enables traders to narrow the bid–ask spread, and consequently 
to reduce transaction costs for investors. If the transaction costs were lower, the investors might trade 
in larger quantities and thus enhance the liquidity of stock market. The investors might also execute 
their trades faster and additionally enhance the liquidity of the market, as they can enter and exit the 
stock market more easily at a time that is most convenient to them. In the market in which it is easier to 
buy and sell stocks, the investors are more likely to invest in productive businesses and the businesses 
are more likely to raise capital. Thereby, the market allocation is more likely to be efficient and the rate 
of economic growth is more likely to be higher. Stock market liquidity is also a key variable for efficient 
market risk pricing. 
 
Although some theorists (e.g. Geraci and Veredas, 2016) argue that the short sellers destabilise the 
market, the vast majority of financial economists (e.g. Lee, 2016; Yadav, Fotak and Raman, 2009; 
Sobaci, Sensoy and Erturk, 2014; Lee and Wang, 2015; Feng and Chan, 2016; Jung, Kim and Lee, 
2013) regard the short sellers as the stock market stability defenders. The short sellers are often 
considered to be positioned at the first line of defence against market instability. Namely, by maintaining 
the stock prices in line with their fundamental values and by reducing the overvaluation of shares, the 
short sellers prevent losses to the other less informed investors, who may otherwise purchase 
overpriced shares. In this way, they enhance corporate governance and prevent firm value dampening. 
Following above mentioned emerges that the short sellers do not trade against the market, but that they 
are the so-called contrarian traders.  
 
Given that there are different views on the effects of the short selling among theorists, regulators, 
governments and media, as well as among theorists themselves, the impact of the short selling on the 
performance of the stock market is still highly controversial. The effects of the short selling have often 
been debated. It has been one of the most considered issues in finance literature, especially since the 
recent global financial crisis. As the short selling is a common practice in many developed markets, most 
existing empirical studies put focus on these markets. Empirical evidence from developed markets 
mainly points to positive roles of the short selling.  
 
Boehmer and Wu (2012), among others, using four different approaches to measure how efficiently 
prices incorporate information (high- and low-frequency measures of the relative informational efficiency 
of prices, post-earnings-announcement drift and return reversals at the daily frequency), discovered that 
the short sellers improve the informational efficiency of prices in the US stock market. Their findings 
suggest that the short sellers help keep prices in line with fundamental values. In other words, the short 
sellers play a critical role in facilitating the efficient price discovery. As the authors of study stated: “The 
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short selling is associated with more efficient pricing in the sense that prices appear to be closer to 
efficient or fundamental values when the short sellers are more active. Our results suggest that the 
efficiency-enhancing effect of the short sales affects prices quickly.” (Boehmer and Wu, 2012, 318) 
Positive influence of the short selling in correcting the overpricing quickly and promoting the price 
discovery process in the US stock market is also argued by Lee (2016). Namely, in the study in which a 
Kalman Filter approach was applied to estimate deviations from a stock’s fundamental value, Lee (2016) 
revealed that the short sellers exploit a temporary mispricing in the market. Specifically, she found the 
higher (lower) levels of the short selling for temporarily overvalued (undervalued) stocks. “High (low) 
short-selling activity in temporarily overvalued (undervalued) stocks leads to the faster reduction of 
mispricing, while high (low) short-selling activity in undervalued (overvalued) stocks delays the 
correction of mispricing.” (Lee, 2016, 830) Through this analysis, Lee (2016) found no evidence that 
heavy shorting activity of the short sellers destabilises the stock market by amplifying the magnitude of 
underpricing.  Edwards and Hanley (2010) found that the short selling contributes to the lower level of 
underpricing even of the IPOs in the US stock market. Contrary to popular belief of many academics 
that the short selling is constrained early in the IPO process, in the study, the authors mentioned that 
the “short selling is an integral part of the aftermarket trading of IPOs. Despite possible constraints on 
both the ability and cost of borrowing shares for delivery, we show that short selling occurs 
simultaneously with opening the trading and without a delay, as previously thought. Short selling occurs 
on the offer day in 99.5% of the IPOs in our sample and the majority of first-day short sales occur at the 
opening of trading.” (Edwards and Hanley, 2010, 21-22)  
 
Blau and Brough (2012) examined whether the short sellers in the US market intend to push prices 
lower in the stocks that are already underpriced or if they are contrarian traders. In the research, the 
authors applied correlation and regression analysis. From a theoretical perspective, when the 
consecutive days of abnormally high shorting activity, which the authors in their study denote as 
concentrated shorting episodes, occur after periods of negative returns, the short sellers are said to 
trade against the market. “On the other hand, if the short sellers add the informational efficiency of 
individual stock prices by targeting stocks that become out-of-line with their fundamental value (Diether 
et al., 2009a), then we expect that concentrated shorting activity will occur in stocks that have 
experienced recent price run-ups.” (Blau and Brough, 2012, 188) According to the authors’ findings, the 
concentrated short selling activity reflects episodes of contrarian trading. It follows periods of positive 
returns rather than periods of negative returns, as well as periods of abnormally high volatility. The short 
sellers will target the stocks that are increasing in price during the periods of high price volatility in order 
to correct overvaluation. Additionally, the authors discovered that the returns become negative shortly 
after the last day of the concentrated shorting episodes. This finding shows that, during the episodes, 
the short sellers are informed about future price movements and can predict them. 
 
While the association between short selling and price changes is weak in normal times, in the 
exceptional circumstances of a severe financial crisis, this relation can become very strong, as Geraci 
and Veredas (2016) proved. Using a measure of tail correlation, they found that the large changes in 
the short selling positions in the North American and European markets are strongly and negatively 
related to large changes in stock prices. Extreme negative price changes are more strongly associated 
with extreme positive rather than extreme negative changes in short selling. This relationship was found 
to be much stronger for small firms, in terms of market capitalisation. This stronger relationship for 
smaller firms can be explained by the fact that the small firms have a generally lower stock liquidity. The 
findings in this study only confirmed the earlier empirical finding that the stocks with lower liquidity are 
more price-sensitive to the short selling.  
 
In financial theory, there is a significant body of literature (which we referred to in the previous 
paragraphs of this section) focusing on the impact of the short selling on stock market quality. However, 
this literature does not distinguish between the influences of covered and naked short selling. 
Theoretically, both covered and naked short selling activity should be beneficial for pricing efficiency, 
liquidity and stability in the market. To check if the naked short selling itself has a positive or negative 
impact on the US Stock Market quality, Yadav, Fotak and Raman (2009) applied a vector autoregressive 
model in order to empirically investigate its effects on, among other things, pricing errors, the volatility 
of stock price returns, bid-ask spreads and pricing error volatility. The authors found that “this impact is 
very positive overall. On average, naked short sellers function effectively as liquidity providers who 
reduce order imbalances, and as value arbitrageurs who stabilise markets and reduce the mispricing of 
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overvalued securities.” (Yadav, Fotak and Raman, 2009, 29) For the Australian Stock Market which 
allows naked short sales for certain securities on an approved short sale list that is revised over time by 
employing market-adjusted model, matching methodology and regression discontinuity design, Lecce, 
Lepone, McKenzie and Segara (2012) revealed that “allowing naked short selling impairs market quality 
(liquidity and volatility), but there appears to be some improvement in price efficiency, with the results 
predominantly limited to stocks with high short sale constraints” (Lecce et al., 2012, 83). 
 
Thornock (2013) examined how dividend taxation affects two key participants in the short selling 
process, i.e. the stock lender and the short seller as the stock borrower, and consequently, how through 
the short selling it influences the US market quality. In the research, the author applied regression 
analysis. According to the author’s findings, the taxes have a negative impact not only on the short sales 
market activity, but also on the market quality. More precisely, the tax effect of holding a short selling 
position open over the dividend dates can lead to the declines in quality of both equity loan and stock 
market, manifesting in increased search frictions in obtaining a stock loan, loan fee inefficiencies, 
microstructure breakdowns and equity mispricing. In short, taxes affect short selling and this effect can 
have substantial negative implications for the US market quality. 
 
Disciplining effect of the short selling on the corporate managers’ earnings management incentives was 
confirmed by Massa, Zhang and Zhang (2015) in the research which covered the short selling activity 
of 17,555 firms from thirty-three developed and developing countries all over the world (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States), and in which a regression analysis was applied. As the authors argued, “the short selling 
affects the behaviour and incentives of managers because its presence can accelerate the pace at 
which information is incorporated into the market and thus allows the market to uncover potential 
earnings management with a higher probability and at a higher speed” (Massa, Zhang and Zhang, 2015, 
1732-1733). The disciplining effect of the short selling applies to various types of earnings management. 
 
Based on everything previously mentioned we can conclude that the short sellers do not destabilise the 
developed market in normal times. Likewise, they would not destabilise the market during a severe 
financial crisis if the stock price sensitivity to the short selling was reduced through the liquidity increase. 
Moreover, the stock market destabilisation would not occur if the short selling activity was not 
constrained. Also, the dividend taxation would not have such a detrimental role for the short selling and 
consequently for the market quality if an appropriate combination of the tax effects and the short selling 
effects on the market development and economy were chosen. The short sellers contribute to the 
improvement of the market quality by correcting the mispricing quickly over time, correctly predicting the 
price movements, increasing the liquidity, achieving the stability and enhancing the corporate 
governance.  
 
 
Implications of the Short Selling on Emerging Stock Markets’ Performance: 
Empirical Evidence  
 
Short selling is a market practice that has mostly positive effects in emerging stock markets, too. The 
evidence for that was provided by, among others, Sobaci, Sensoy and Erturk (2014), Lee and Wang 
(2015 and 2016), Chen and Rhee (2010), Chague, De-Losso, De Genaro and Giovannetti (2013), Feng 
and Chan (2016), Jung, Kim and Lee (2013), Wang, Lee and Woo (2017), Aksoy and Dastan (2011), 
Deng and Gao (2018), Ni and Yin (2017) and Luo, Ni and Tian (2019). 
 
Sobaci, Sensoy and Erturk (2014) employed a VAR(p)-cDCC-FIEGARCH(1,d,1) approach in their 
research and found that the increased short sales in Turkey over the period from January 3, 2005 to 
December 31, 2012 were associated with the improvement of market quality. Over the entire observed 
period, including the 2008 financial crisis, the short sellers acted as the contrarian traders and as such 
they had a stabilising role in the market. They also contributed to the more efficient markets by avoiding 
any overvaluation in stock prices, and to the greater liquidity. During the crisis, the relationship between 
the short selling and three market quality variables (market return, liquidity and volatility) weakened to a 
degree, but they remained sufficiently robust for the short sellers to be still considered to have no 
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adverse effect on the market quality. Same as the Turkish short sellers, foreign short sellers in the 
Korean Stock Market, in which the majority (about 88%) of the short selling activity was performed by 
this type of the short sellers during the observed period from January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2010, followed 
contrarian trading strategy, as Lee and Wang (2015) revealed in the research in which a regression 
analysis was applied. Trading in accordance with this strategy enables the short-term future return to 
be predictable based on the short selling activity of foreign investors. The future return predictability 
referred only to the stocks with high short selling activity and it was higher in the earlier observed period 
than in the subsequent sub-period. Furthermore, the short-selling role of foreign investors in providing 
liquidity was not found in the analysed market. “Short-selling provides liquidity to the market if it is 
performed to absorb excessive buying pressure. That is, foreign investors provide liquidity through short-
selling when they bet on short-run price reversals, considering that the past days’ positive returns are 
due to temporary buying pressure.” (Lee and Wang, 2015, 6) Even though the foreign short sellers 
increased their short selling activity when the buying pressure was high, the level of the short selling 
activity was not sufficient to fully resolve the buying pressure. Therefore, they did not improve stock 
market liquidity. The authors also found that the short selling activity of foreign investors was not 
associated with the future return volatility increase. Following above-mentioned emerges that the short 
selling of foreign investors had no an adverse impact on stock prices, liquidity, and volatility in the Korean 
Stock Market. 
 
Short sales significantly enhance overall market efficiency in Hong Kong Stock Market, too. As Chen 
and Rhee stated in the conclusion of their research study, “short sales speed up the price adjustment 
to not only firm-specific private/public but also market-wide information” (Chen and Rhee, 2010, 483). 
The predictive power of the level of short selling activity over stock prices in the Brazil Stock Market was 
empirically confirmed in the study of Chague, De-Losso, De Genaro and Giovannetti (2013), in which 
the panel regressions were applied in the research. It comes from two distinct channels. The first channel 
is related to the demand for short selling. The second one is related to the supply of stock lending. 
Hypothetically, a higher demand for the short selling should anticipate lower short-run future returns if 
the short sellers are well informed investors with superior analytical skills. A higher supply of the short 
selling should anticipate lower short-run future returns if the short sellers are not able to sell short the 
full amount they are willing to. In other words, overpricing would occur if there were short sale 
constraints. These two hypotheses were empirically proven. Based on the results, the authors finally 
made a conclusion according to which “the short-sellers are informed traders but, since they are usually 
able to sell short less than they are willing to, prices do not reflect all information present in the market”. 
(Chague et al., 2013, 15) 
 
The predictive power, as well as the stabilising role of the short selling over stock prices in the Chinese 
Stock Market during the three-year period from 2010 through 2012 was discovered by Feng and Chan 
(2016) using regression analysis. According to the authors’ findings, during the analysed time interval, 
the short sellers in China possessed information advantage during the earnings announcement periods 
and they were able to increase (reduce) short selling positions before the firm experienced the negative 
(positive) earnings surprise. Simply put, the short sellers were informed traders and they were able to 
utilise the forthcoming earning announcement events to make a profit. Extreme short selling preceded 
future negative returns, i.e. it signalled the negative future return movements. Predicting the future 
returns in a three-day window after earnings announcement was possible on the basis of extreme short 
selling. 
 
In their research, Jung, Kim and Lee (2013) and Wang, Lee and Woo (2017) put focus on the influence 
of the individual investors' participation in short sale on the market quality and profitability of the short 
selling in the Korean stock market, respectively. Jung, Kim and Lee (2013) executed difference-in-
difference estimations, panel regression analysis and matching-firm analysis and found that the 
individual short sellers enhanced the efficiency of stock pricing, increased the stock liquidity and did not 
destabilise stock market during the period from January 2007 to August 2008. Specifically, the 
participation of individual investors in the short sales did not significantly change the volatility and 
skewness of stock return and caused the stocks to be traded within a narrower bid–ask spread. 
According to the findings of Wang, Lee and Woo (2017), which were obtained in regression analysis, 
the individual investors' participation in short sale contributed to the profitability of the short selling in the 
Korean Stock Market over a relatively long period from August 1, 2007 to May 31, 2010. Namely, in the 
observed period, the profitability of individual investors’ short selling was empirically proven, that is, the 
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individual short sellers made a profit from their short selling activity. The short sellers had a 
predominantly short investment horizon. As the investment horizon lengthened, the profitability of short 
selling decreased. Furthermore, the short sellers who were selling multiple stocks short (i.e. stocks of a 
larger number of companies) made a higher profit than those who were selling only fewer stocks short 
(i.e. stocks of fewer companies). Finally, the profitability of individual investors' short selling was proven 
to be persistent in the Korean Stock Market over the analysed period. Lee and Wang (2016) also 
investigated the profitability of the individual investors' short selling in the Korean Stock Market, but they 
shed a light on this issue from another viewpoint. Namely, using profitability measures and regression 
analysis, they examined if the individual investors' short sales, which are initiated and closed on the 
same day, and which the authors briefly marked as “day trading short selling” were profitable during the 
period from August 1, 2007 to May 31, 2010, whereby the short selling ban period from October 1, 2008 
to May 31, 2009 was excluded. As the authors discovered, in the short selling market in Korea, the day 
trading short selling is very prevalent and mostly profitable. “The profits are higher for the shorts that are 
initiated in the morning and are held longer in a given day or for those that are made when the intraday 
volatility is high.” (Lee and Wang, 2016, 210) 
 
Aksoy and Dastan (2011) tested whether the day of the week effect and the weekend effect were present 
and affected short selling activity and short sellers’ returns in Istanbul Stock Exchange from 2005 to 
2009 or not, applying correlation and regression analysis. Their results indicated the presence of a day 
of the week effect for the short selling activity. The short selling pattern across the days of the week was 
statistically different. The highest short selling was observed on Monday and after holidays. The lowest 
short selling was observed on Tuesday. Contrary to the expected result, the existence of the weekend 
effect was not empirically confirmed. A positive correlation between short selling and returns for all days 
of the week was found. “The correlation was the greatest on Monday (0.177), contradicting the notion 
that short selling pressure decreases returns on Monday, thus causing a weekend effect.” (Aksoy and 
Dastan, 2011, 210) Based on the obtained results, the authors made a conclusion that the short sellers 
are sophisticated and well informed traders, who can exploit return anomalies and trade according to 
them, which is why they can be considered to be the contrarian traders focused on balancing returns. 
 
The influence of the short selling activities on the behaviour and performance of the Chinese companies 
was examined by Deng and Gao (2018), Ni and Yin (2019) and Luo, Ni, and Tian (2019). Applying 
regression analysis, the first group of authors discovered that during the period from March 31, 2010 to 
November 9, 2012, the short sellers generated monitoring effects, i.e. they performed some kind of 
monitoring over the companies. There are two explanations for these effects. The first one was a positive 
relation between the short selling and the probability of corporate fraud detection. The short sellers were 
able to identify the potential corporate fraud earlier and respond to it. The second explanation was a 
negative relation between the short selling and the future stock price crash risk. As the authors stated, 
“the effects of increased short selling activities on reducing the crash risk are stronger for the firms of 
smaller size and lower state ownership.” (Deng and Gao, 2018, 69) “The short selling monitoring effect 
is stronger for firms with higher degree of information asymmetry and higher stock market sensitive 
agency costs.” (Deng and Gao, 2018, 77) The study of Ni and Yin (2019) is one of the first research 
which provided empirical evidence on the negative effect of the short selling. The authors used a 
difference in differences regression specification in their research and found that the companies will 
follow more conservative investment and financial policies if the short selling is allowed. The level and 
risk of corporate investments will bring about significant negative changes. The likelihood of the 
corporate debt and equity financing will also be reduced and the saved capital will be used to decrease 
financial leverage. The consequences of such corporate behaviour will be reduced risk-taking and 
decreased firm performance. According to the author’s standpoint, the large institutional differences in 
the analysed market compared to the US and other developed markets can explain why their findings 
are fundamentally different from those in developed markets. Contrary to the developed markets, the 
concentrated ownership and weak investor protection exist in the analysed market. Therefore, the 
authors emphasised that under these conditions, it is important to consider the institutional differences 
in ownership structure and the strength of the investor protection when the economic impact of the short 
selling is being assessed. Although Ni and Yin examined the real effect of the short selling in China from 
2008 to 2014, they stated in the conclusion of the study: “As China shares many common institutional 
features with other emerging markets, we can draw broader conclusions from the broader experiment 
in China and generalise them into other developing economies.” (Ni and Yin, 2019, 29) A negative 
impact of the short selling on the behaviour of Chinese companies was also revealed by Luo, Ni, and 
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Tian (2019). Namely, using a difference in differences regression specification, the authors examined a 
causal relation between the short selling and the corporate tax avoidance in China during the period 
from 2007 to 2015, and discovered that the short selling incited corporate tax avoidance. The analysed 
relation was more pronounced, that is, significant tax avoidance increase was observed in financially 
constrained (i.e. smaller and younger) firms and in non-state-owned enterprises. The obtained results 
suggest that the tax avoidance helps Chinese companies generate additional internal funds for financing 
the future investment opportunities and growth (that is, tax avoidance acts as a financing mechanism 
which is an alternative to the costly external financing) and thus helps them mitigate the adverse effects 
of the short selling that they are experiencing under downward price pressure. Tax avoidance was 
possible in China because it was not expensive. Weak law enforcement, mild legal penalties and a lack 
of external monitoring mechanisms made tax avoidance cost efficient or even free. Finally, Luo, Ni, and 
Tian, similarly to Ni and Yin, made a conclusion “that the findings might be generalizable to many other 
developing economies, at least those with strong government intervention and lax law enforcement” 
(Luo, Ni and Tian, 2019, 4). 
 
 
Consequences of Imposing Constraints on Short Selling  
 
Regulators in many developed and developing countries imposed constraints on short selling during the 
previous global financial crisis and debt crisis. For example, on July 9, 2008, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) curbed the naked short selling for nineteen financial firms in the United 
States. In September 2008, the SEC placed a temporary ban on the covered short selling of selected 
financial stocks as well. At the same time, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) temporarily banned 
the short selling (both covered and naked) of leading financial stocks in the United Kingdom. Other 
countries soon followed them and imposed their own short selling constraints. Australia and Korea 
temporarily banned the short selling of all stocks and for all of its forms. Afterwards, Australia banned 
the naked short selling indefinitely. Canada, Denmark, Indonesia, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Norway, 
Pakistan and Russia placed a ban on the short selling of leading financial stocks. Japan and Switzerland 
banned the naked short selling of all stocks. The ban on the naked short selling of leading financial 
stocks was placed in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands. In 
most markets, the naked short selling has remained largely outlawed, while the covered short selling 
was reinstated as a legitimate trading activity.  
 
In order to respond to the debt crisis, on August 11, 2011, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) decided to impose a coordinated ban on the short selling of financial institutions stocks in four 
European equity markets, i.e. Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. “Although these measures were 
expected to be in place for 15 days only (with the exception of Belgium, which announced that the ban 
would remain in effect indefinitely), they remained active until February 2012.” Temporary banning the 
short selling of financial stocks “aimed to reduce volatility and to stop (or, at least, mitigate) financial 
panic and downward spiral in prices”. (Alves, Mendes and Silva, 2016, 252-253) 
 
Contrary to the above-mentioned countries, China was continuously prohibiting the short selling until 
March 31, 2010. On this day, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched a pilot 
program, intending to gradually remove the short selling ban. To achieve this, it designated and 
periodically revised the list of stocks eligible for short selling. The stock would be included in the list if it 
met the size, liquidity and volatility requirements. The list has been substantially expanded over time. In 
China, the naked short selling is not allowed. 
 
Since January 1994, in Hong Kong, the short selling has been allowed only for the stocks which are 
listed on the so-called D-list. The stocks which satisfied certain requirements, i.e. which are qualified to 
be sold short are listed on this D-list. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) has revised and expanded 
the list every quarter. “Any stocks not on the D-list are prohibited from short sales. This restriction makes 
the HKEx unique, whereas almost all stocks can be sold short in the NYSE and the NASDAQ.1” (Chen 
and Rhee, 2010, 473)  
 
 
1 Securities traded in the OTC markets including NASDAQ Small Cap, OTC Bulletin Board, and OTC Pink Sheets 
are not subject to short sale restrictions. 
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Placing the short selling ban was mostly motivated by the intention of regulators to mitigate the turmoil 
in financial markets,  make sudden and excessive fluctuations of the stock prices impossible,  prevent 
share prices plummeting sharply,  stop illegal stock price manipulation,  disable a regulatory arbitrage 
in cross-listed stocks, decrease the volatility and contagion risk of financial institutions and, consequently 
maintain fair and orderly markets. It was sometimes motivated simply by the lack of  institutional 
framework for borrowing shares to be sold short. Was the short selling ban really effective? Financial 
theory and empirical evidence have been trying to provide answer to this question so far. 
 
In financial theory, there has been an intense debate over the effects of short selling constraints. 
According to the widely accepted attitudes (e.g. Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015; Helmes, 
Henker, Henker and Smith, 2017; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Frino, Lecce and Lepone, 2011; Marsh and 
Payne, 2012; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011; Jain, Jain, McInish and McKenzie, 2013; Dungey, McKenzie 
and Yalama, 2013; Chang, Luo and Ren, 2014; Ebrahimnejad and Hoseinzade, 2019; Sochi, 2018; 
Saastamoinen and Suhonen, 2013: Alves, Mendes and Silva, 2016; Grima and Sammut, 2017), the 
restriction or non-existence of the regulated short selling can reduce stock price efficiency, slow down 
stock price discovery process, amplify market fluctuations, which can induce the increase in the 
possibility of extreme events occurrence, make the stock market much more vulnerable to speculative 
bubbles, destabilise the stock market, seriously slow down stock market recovery and/or pose limitations 
in derivatives market development. The impact of the short selling restrictions on the stock market 
liquidity and stock pricing is ambiguous. Some authors (e.g. Helmes, Henker, Henker and Smith, 2017; 
Beber and Pagano, 2013; Chang, Luo and Ren, 2014) argue that placing the short selling ban causes 
bid-ask spread increase and stock overpricing, while others (e.g. Battalio, Mehran and Schultz, 2012; 
Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015) suggest that the short selling constraints may have opposite 
effects. The theoretical knowledge was empirically tested and the predominantly negative influence of 
the short selling ban was proven. 
 
In the US Stock Market, for example, in 2008, “the prices of financial stocks fell more than 12 percent 
over the fourteen days during which the ban was in effect. Shortly after the ban was lifted, however, the 
prices of financial stocks stabilised” (Battalio, Mehran and Schultz, 2012, 4), as Battalio, Mehran and 
Schultz stated in their study. Grullon, Michenaud and Weston (2015) also discovered negative influence 
of the short selling ban in the US Stock Market. Namely, applying regression analysis, the authors 
examined the effects of the regulatory change in 2005, which implied the removal of restrictions on the 
short selling for the firms from pilot group, on stock prices and corporate behaviour. They revealed that 
this regulatory change caused an increase in the short selling activity, generated stock prices decline 
and distorted investment and financing decisions (investment and equity issuances declined) for the 
randomly selected group of firms representing the pilot group. “Firms in the pilot group with a big 
increase in short-selling activity exhibit larger reductions in investment and equity issuance.” (Grullon, 
Michenaud and Weston, 2015, 1740) “The results are stronger for small firms and for firms that were 
more likely to be overvalued and/or more susceptible to bear raids prior to the regulatory change.” 
(Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015,  1764) Following obtained findings emerges that the short 
selling constraints in the USA disrupted stock price efficiency and destabilised stock market. 
 
In the Australian Stock Market, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the restrictions on short selling 
were imposed for all financial firms over a period of 8 months. These restrictions were aimed at calming 
the market, preserving the market confidence and supporting the prices. There was no evidence that 
the short selling ban contributed to achieving the goals of the regulators, as Helmes, Henker, Henker 
and Smith (2017) determined in the research implemented by employing a matching procedure in 
conjunction with a fixed-effect panel methodology. Due to restricting the short selling, market confidence 
eroded and market quality severely degraded, that is, the stocks subject to the short selling ban 
experienced an increase in volatility and bid–ask spreads and a decrease in trading activity. Contrary to 
the intention of Australian regulators, the short selling ban generated substantial negative effects in the 
targeted stock market. 
 
According to the findings of Beber and Pagano (2013) obtained with panel data techniques, the short 
selling bans or regulatory constraints imposed during the global financial crisis were detrimental to three 
dimensions of market performance in 30 countries (most European markets and developed non-
European markets such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
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New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States). Specifically, in the analysed markets, the bid-ask spreads 
observed a statistically and economically significant increase, whereby the adverse liquidity effect was 
stronger for the stocks with small market capitalisation, higher volatility and no listed options. Beber and 
Pagano stated: “For the dually listed stocks in our sample, short-selling bans in the home market 
increased bid-ask spreads both on the home and on the foreign market, while bans in the foreign market 
only reduced liquidity locally, without spillover liquidity effects to the home market.” (Beber and Pagano, 
2013, 345) Furthermore, the short selling bans slowed down price discovery, especially in the event 
when the prices responded to bad news. Finally, the effects of the short selling bans on stock prices 
were at worst negative and at best neutral. Four dimensions of the market quality, i.e. abnormal returns, 
stock price volatility, bid-ask spreads and trading volume were adversely affected by the short selling 
bans, which were imposed in 2008, in eleven countries around the world (Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), as Frino, 
Lecce and Lepone (2011) found as well. Deterioration in four dimensions of market quality, i.e. in trading 
activity, liquidity, efficiency and price discovery, for financial stocks in the UK Equity Market from the 
start of June 2008 to the end of February 2009 was also discovered by Marsh and Payne (2012) using 
a difference in differences regression specification and Hasbrouck VAR approach. Even for the sample 
consisting of 26 both developed and developing markets all over the world (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States) using regression analysis, Saffi and Sigurdsson 
(2011) proved that the short selling constraints were associated with less price efficiency. As the authors 
concluded in their study, the stocks with limited lending supply and high borrowing fees had a longer 
delay in responding to market-wide shocks. Relaxing the short selling restrictions was associated with 
an increase in speed by which the information was incorporated into prices. Large and more liquid firms 
also tended to have more efficient prices, while those with higher leverage or low book-to-market ratios 
tended to be less efficient. 
 
By using a sample which also consisted of both developed and developing markets all over the world, 
Jain, Jain, McInish and McKenzie (2013) and Dungey, McKenzie and Yalama (2013) implemented a 
research in order to examine whether the home market short selling constraints affected home market 
only or other markets as well. Jain, Jain, McInish and McKenzie applied regression analysis and 
revealed that the short selling-related stock borrowing within home market decreased by 45%, and the 
short selling of home country’s ADRs reduced by 68% in 82 countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe), as a consequence of 
placing the 2008 short selling restrictions. With these results the authors provided evidence in support 
of the regulatory reach hypothesis according to which the “home country restrictions curtail short selling 
of cross-listed stocks in foreign markets. In the current context, this suggests that foreign country trading 
restrictions decrease short selling of a stock’s ADR in the US market.” (Jain et al., 2013, 178) In other 
words, they proved that national regulators were able to effectively enforce the short selling restrictions 
both within and outside their home markets. However, if the competing hypothesis of regulatory arbitrage 
had been proven, it would have required that the short selling move to foreign locations, after the home 
market introduced restrictions, i.e. that the volume of ADRs short selling increase, because traders opted 
to trade in unrestricted regimes. In this case, it would be concluded that the short selling restrictions 
influence home market only. Not only the volume of the short selling activity outside the home market, 
but also the direction of spillovers from shocks among countries with and without the restrictions can be 
affected by the home market short selling constraints. Namely, by using a sample consisting of 26 
developed and the countries with emerging markets from Europe, North America, South America and 
Asia, whereby some of them imposed short selling bans (Australia, Denmark, Greece, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, USA) and some did not (Argentina, 
Brazil, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Singapore, Italy, 
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Sweden), and estimating the spillover index, Dungey, McKenzie and Yalama investigated the impact of 
the home market short selling constraints on the market volatility dynamics during the crisis period in 
2008. They found that the volatility was redirected towards the markets in which the short selling bans 
were not imposed. More specifically, during the periods when the short selling bans were in place, “the 
impact of shocks emanating from countries which imposed short sale bans was reduced, particularly on 
other markets that also imposed bans. However, the impact of shocks from markets that did not impose 
bans was increased.” (Dungey, McKenzie and Yalama, 2013, 69) Following the above-mentioned it 
appears  that, during the periods when the short selling bans were in place, the bans did not provide 
protection from shocks emanating from countries where they were not in effect. 
 
A research concerning the effectiveness of bans on short selling in emerging markets only is scarce. 
Continuous bans on the short selling in many emerging markets could explain the lack of this research. 
These bans have made it difficult for researchers to examine the effect of bans there. The researchers 
cannot examine the short selling effects in the common approach by comparing the effects before and 
after the changes in short selling regulations, as the investors in many emerging markets have never 
been able to sell stocks short. Similar to most research implemented in developed stock markets, and 
in the available studies which covered emerging markets, an adverse effect of the short selling bans on 
the market efficiency, price discovery, market stability and future return predictability was found. Thus, 
using regression analysis, Chang, Luo and Ren (2014) discovered that the intensified short selling 
activity in China, after the ban was lifted, generated negative event returns, improved price efficiency 
particularly during market downturns, decreased return volatility in both the up- and down-market, 
declined the frequency of extreme stock returns and made future returns prediction over up to five 
trading days feasible. Based on the obtained results, they made a conclusion that the short selling 
constraints in China contributed to stock overvaluation, hindered price discovery, destabilised the stock 
market and reduced predictive power of trades by the short sellers. Furthermore, using regression 
analysis, Ebrahimnejad and Hoseinzade (2019) revealed that, after the removal of constraints in the 
Hong Kong market, the short selling improved stock price informativeness and reduced the common 
movement of stock prices in the market. Their findings point to the negative impact of the short selling 
ban on the price efficiency in Hong Kong, too. The same effect of the short selling restrictions on the 
price efficiency was also found for the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). Namely, using data covering the 
period from January 1999 through December 2014, and employing the runs test in conjunction with a 
Monte Carlo simulation, Sochi documented that “for both good and bad news, the DSE ban on short 
selling causes prices to adjust more slowly to a new equilibrium, resulting in a disproportionate number 
of lengthy return runs” (Sochi, 2018, 3). 
 
An ineffectiveness of the European short selling ban, which was placed as a response to the debt crisis 
in 2011, was proven in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain. Namely, Saastamoinen and Suhonen 
(2013) applied differences-in-differences and differences-in-differences-in-differences methodologies in 
order to measure effectiveness of the ban by comparing the returns volatility of financial stocks from 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain to their US cross-listings (so-called ADRs), as well as to the 
returns volatility of financial stocks from four European countries (Ireland, Germany, Portugal and the 
Netherlands) which, among others, did not join the ban, before and after the ban was issued. The 
authors revealed that the returns volatility of all the analysed financial stocks increased after the ban 
was placed compared to the volatility before the ban occurred. Such result indicates the ineffectiveness 
of the ban. If the ban had been effective, after imposing the ban, the returns of the banned stocks traded 
in Europe would have exhibited less volatility than those of their ADRs and of other European stocks 
not subjected to the ban. 
 
Mostly adverse effect of the short selling ban on the liquidity, volatility, price discovery mechanisms and 
price dynamics of securities subjected to the August 2011 bans in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain was 
also found by Alves, Mendes and Silva (2016) and Grima and Sammut (2017). According to the findings 
of these two groups of authors, the bans had a negative impact on liquidity and volatility in the stock 
markets. The second group of authors additionally discovered that the negative impact of the bans on 
the market liquidity was short-term for all the analysed countries, while the bans had a negative impact 
on volatility over a short period as well, but with the exception of Spain. The results associated with the 
influence of bans on the price discovery mechanisms, which were obtained by the above-mentioned 
authors, are different. For all four countries, Alves, Mendes and Silva documented “a longer delay in the 
adjustment to negative market-wide news, particularly among stocks subjected to the bans. Conversely, 
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the delay in the adjustment to positive market-wide news falls.” (Alves, Mendes and Silva, 2016, 254) 
On the other hand, Grima and Sammut found that the bans slowed down price discovery in Belgium 
and France and did not affect price discovery mechanisms in Spain and Italy. After the bans were lifted, 
all countries experienced a better price discovery performance, indicating their short-term impact on the 
price discovery mechanisms. Finally, the above-mentioned two groups of authors agreed about the 
positive influence of the bans on the financial stock prices in all four analysed countries. However, they 
did not agree about the duration of influence. Alves, Mendes and Silva provided evidence that the impact 
on prices was only temporary. Contrary to this evidence, the short selling bans were found by Grima 
and Sammut to have a positive long-term impact on the prices of the banned financial stocks. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Every time the short selling drew the attention of theorists, practitioners and regulators, the question 
whether the short sellers were responsible for panic selling and massive stock price declines or for the 
correction of mispricing, liquidity increase and volatility decrease, i.e. market quality improvement was 
raised once again. In many developed markets, the widely accepted theoretical attitude that the short 
sellers improve the overall market quality was empirically proven. There, the short sellers largely 
contribute to the market quality improvement by correcting the mispricing quickly over time, correctly 
predicting the price movements, increasing the liquidity, achieving the stability and enhancing the 
corporate governance. Therefore, the empirical evidence from developed stock markets mostly 
indicates positive roles of the short selling. The positive influence of the short selling would be complete 
if the stock price sensitivity to the short selling was additionally reduced through the liquidity increase, if 
the short selling activity was not constrained anywhere and if an appropriate combination of the tax 
effects and the short selling effects on the market development and economy was chosen. Although the 
short selling cannot be practiced in many emerging market countries due to the lack of a suitable 
regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure, positive effects were mostly found in many markets 
where it is allowed. Opposite findings related to the influence of the short selling activities on the 
behaviour and performance of companies only come from the countries where the concentrated 
ownership, weak investor protection, weak law enforcement, mild legal penalties and no external 
monitoring mechanisms exist. Based on everything previously mentioned, we can conclude that the 
short selling could improve the quality of emerging stock markets, under the condition that there is at 
least a basic regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure. Given that short selling mostly has a 
positive influence on the quality of stock markets under the stated conditions, the establishment and 
development of a suitable regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure is recommended for the 
markets where short selling cannot be practiced. As the regulatory, institutional and market infrastructure 
becomes more and more developed, the possibility of the market quality to be improved to a higher 
degree by the short selling will increase. 
 
A large number of regulators from stock markets around the world, who were concerned about potential 
adverse effects of the short selling during various episodes of crises or who know that the regulatory, 
institutional and market infrastructure has not sufficiently or at all developed yet, decided to place some 
constraints on short selling at different points in time and for different periods of time, ignoring the 
existing scientific and empirical evidence about mostly positive short selling effects. However, these 
constraints were ineffective in many developed and emerging markets. The short selling bans or 
regulatory constraints largely caused disruption of stock price efficiency, a slowdown in stock price 
discovery process, a decline in stock market liquidity, the destabilisation of stock market, a decrease in 
trading activity and reduction of predictive power of trades by the short sellers. These findings further 
strengthen our conclusion. 
 
Given that a research concerning the effectiveness of bans on short selling in emerging markets only is 
scarce, further investigation could be directed at finding an appropriate approach for this effectiveness 
to be measured. In this way, a more credible cost-benefit analysis of imposing the constraints on short 
selling could be done. Afterwards, the regulators might eventually want to rethink the prohibition of short 
selling in their countries. Moreover, future research could be aimed at discovering the level of market 
capitalisation and liquidity to which the stock price sensitivity to the short selling activity should be 
detrimental to stock price efficiency. Finally, choosing dividend taxation model beneficial for the short 
selling and consequently for the market quality, i.e. the model which will ensure achieving the optimal 
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combination of the tax effects and the short selling effects on the market development and economy 
could be the objective of further research as well. 
 
 
References 
 
Aksoy, M. and Dastan, I. (2011), “Short Selling and the Day of the Week Effect for Istanbul Stock 
Exchange“, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, No. 70, pp. 205-216. URL: 
http://www.internationalresearchjournaloffinanceandeconomics.com/ISSUES/IRJFE_Issue_70.htm 
Alves, C., Mendes, V. and Silva, P. (2016), “Analysis of Market Quality Before and During Short-selling 
Bans”, Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 37 Issue C, pp. 252-268. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2015.11.009 
Angel, J. J. and McCabe, D. M. (2009), “The Business Ethics of Short Selling and Naked Short Selling”, 
Journal of Business Ethics, No. 85, pp. 239–249. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9943-5 
Battalio, R., Mehran, H. and Schultz, T. P. (2012), “Market Declines: What is Accomplished by Banning 
Short-selling?”, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 18 No. 5, pp. URL: 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci18-5.html 
Beber, A. and Pagano, M. (2013), “Short-selling Bans Around the World: Evidence From the 2007–09 
Crisis”, The Journal of Finance, vol. 68 No. 1, pp. 343-381. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2012.01802.x 
Bianchi R. and Drew M. (2012), “On the Ethics of Short Selling”. Discussion Papers in Finance 2012-
12, Griffith University, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics. URL: 
https://www120.secure.griffith.edu.au/research/file/ddb0c8ef-413f-4f7f-b462-acb803aa70b8/1/2012-
12-on-the-ethics-of-short-selling.pdf  
Blau, B. and Brough, T. (2012), “Concentrated Short-selling Activity: Bear Raids or Contrarian Trading?”, 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 187-203. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17439131211238851 
Boehmer, E. and Wu, J. (2012), “Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process”, The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 287-322. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs097 
Chague, F. D., De-Losso, R., De Genaro, A. and Giovannetti B. (2013), “Short-sellers: Informed but 
Restricted”, Working paper No 2013-05, University of São Paulo, Department of Economics, FEA-UPS. 
URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/ChagueDe_LossoGenaroGiovannetti05WP.pdf 
Chague, F. D., De-Losso, R. and Giovannetti B. (2019), “The Short-selling Skill of Institutions and 
Individuals”, Journal of Banking & Finance, No. 101, pp. 77-91. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.02.003 
Chague, F. D. and Giovannetti, B. (2017), “Uncovering Skilled Short-sellers”, Working Papers No 2017-
01, University of São Paulo, Department of Economics (FEA-USP). URL: 
http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/Chague_DeLosso_Giovannetti_01WPa.pdf 
Chang, E. C., Luo, Y. and Ren, J. (2014), “Short-selling, Margin-trading, and Price Efficiency: Evidence 
From the Chinese Market”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 48 Issue C, pp. 411-424. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.10.002 
Chen, C. X. and Rhee, S. G. (2010), “Short Sales and Speed of Price Adjustment: Evidence From the 
Hong Kong Stock Market”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 471-483. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.012 
Deng, X. and Gao, L. (2018), “The Monitoring of Short Selling: Evidence From China”, Research in 
International Business and Finance, Vol. 43 Issue C, pp. 68-78. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.087 
Dungey, M., McKenzie, M. D. and Yalama, A. (2013), “The Cross Market Effects of Short Sale 
Restrictions”, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 26 Issue C, pp. 53-71. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2013.06.001 
Ebrahimnejad, A. and Hoseinzade, S. (2019), “Short-sale Constraints and Stock Price Informativeness”, 
Global Finance Journal, Vol. 40 Issue C, pp. 28-34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2018.11.002 
Edwards, A. K. and Hanley, K. W. (2010), “Short Selling in Initial Public Offerings”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 98 No. 1, pp. 21-39. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.010 
Fantazzini, D. and Maggi, M. (2012), “Short Selling in Emerging Markets: A Comparison of Market 
Performance During the Global Financial Crisis”, Handbook of Short Selling, Elsevier, pp. 339-352. URL: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1960108 
N. Pobrić  Economy, Business & Development (2020) 1(1) 
 17 
Feng, X. and Chan, K. C. (2016), “Information Advantage, Short Sales, and Stock Returns: Evidence 
From Short Selling Reform in China”, Economic Modelling, No. 59, pp. 131-142. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.07.007 
Frino A., Lecce S. and Lepone A. (2011), “Short-sales Constraints and Market Quality: Evidence From 
the 2008 Short-sales Bans”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 225-236. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2011.04.001 
Geraci, M. V. and Veredas, D. (2016), “Short Selling in the Tails”, Working Papers No ECARES 2016-
30, Universite Libre de Bruxelles – ULB. URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-235546.html 
Grima, S. and Sammut, S. (2017), “A Study on the Impact of the Short Selling Ban on FIBS”, 
International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), Vol. V No. 1, pp. 18-48. URL: 
https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar//handle/123456789/25686 
Grullon, G., Michenaud, S. and Weston, J. P. (2015), “The Real Effects of Short-selling Constraints”, 
The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 1737–1767. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv013 
Helmes, U., Henker, J., Henker, T. and Smith, T. (2017), “Effect of the Ban on Short Selling on Market 
Prices and Volatility”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 57 No. 3, pp. 727-757. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12211 
Jain, A., Jain, P., McInish T. and McKenzie, M. (2013), “Worldwide Reach of Short Selling Regulations”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109 No. 1, pp. 177-197. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.012 
Jung, C. S., Kim W. and Lee, D. W. (2013), “Short Selling by Individual Investors: Destabilizing or Price 
Discovering?”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 1232-1248. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2012.09.001 
Lecce, S., Lepone, A., McKenzie, M. D. and Segara, R. (2012), “The Impact of Naked Short Selling on 
the Securities Lending and Equity Market”, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 81-107. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2011.07.001 
Lee, E. (2016), “Short Selling and Market Mispricing”, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 797–833. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-015-0521-5 
Lee, K-H. and Wang, S-F. (2015), “Do Foreign Short-sellers Predict Stock Returns? Evidence From 
Daily Short-selling in Korean Stock Market”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, No. 32, pp. 56-75. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.01.004 
Lee, K-H. and Wang, S-F. (2016), “Short-selling With a Short Wait: Trade- and Account-level Analyses 
in Korean Stock Market”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, No. 38, pp. 209-222. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.05.001 
Luo, J., Ni, X. and Tian, G. G. (2019), “Short Selling and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Insights From a 
Financial Constraint View”, URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3108510 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3108510  
Marsh, I. W. and Payne, R. (2012), “Banning Short Sales and Market Quality: The UK’s Experience”, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 36 No. 7, pp. 1975-1986. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.03.005 
Massa, M., Zhang, B. and Zhang, H. (2015), “The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling 
Discipline Earnings Management?”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 1701-1736. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu147 
Ni, X. and Yin, S. (2019), “The Unintended Real Effects of Short Selling in an Emerging Market”, Asian 
Finance Association (AsianFA) 2017 Conference, URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2680336 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2680336 
Reed, A. V. (2013), “Short Selling”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 245-258. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101813 
Saastamoinen, J. and Suhonen, N. (2013), “Were the European short selling bans of 2011 effective?”, 
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 1847-1851. URL: 
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I3-P173.pdf 
Saffi, P. A. and Sigurdsson, K. (2011), “Price Efficiency and Short Selling”, The Review of Financial 
Studies, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 821-852. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq124 
Sobaci, C., Sensoy, A. and Erturk, M. (2014), “Impact of Short Selling Activity on Market Dynamics: 
Evidence From an Emerging Market”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 15 Issue C, pp. 53-62. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.08.010 
Sochi, M. (2018), “A Test of Market Efficiency When Short Selling is Prohibited: A Case of the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange”, Journal of Risk and Financial Management, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 1-17. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm11040059 
N. Pobrić  Economy, Business & Development (2020) 1(1) 
 18 
Thornock, J. (2013), “The Effects of Dividend Taxation on Short Selling and Market Quality”, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 88 No. 5, pp. 1833-1856. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50479 
Wang, S-F., Lee, K-H. and Woo, M-C. (2017), “Do Individual Short-sellers Make Money? Evidence From 
Korea”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 79 Issue C, pp. 159-172. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.03.012 
Yadav, P. K., Fotak, V. and Raman, V. (2009), “Naked Short Selling: The Emperor`s New Clothes?”, 
CFR Working Papers No 09-09, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR). URL: 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/41369/1/616611501.pdf 
